Innovate Articles

 

Does This Web Dress Make My Site Look Distinctive?

Joe Schuler

 

The legal landscape for protecting website look and feel.

 

  1. Introduction

     

    This article discusses the legal landscape surrounding liability under the Lanham Act and under the New York General Business Law for mimicking the trade dress of a competitor’s website. It also addresses the practicalities of acquiring jurisdiction over a defendant.

     

    1. Trade Dress Infringement: “Web Dress”

       

      1. Trade Dress Defined

         

        Trade dress claims have been analogized to the common law tort of unfair competition; a product’s trade dress has been called “essentially its total image and overall appearance.”[1] Trade dress can include such features as “size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”[2]

         

        The protection of trade dress is derived from the core principles of trademark law, to protect source identifying characteristics that distinguish the source of the good or service from other sources in order to promote its sale.[3] Trade dress protection focuses on how an “arrangement of identifying characteristics or decoration connected to a product, whether by packaging or otherwise, [is] intended to make the source of the product distinguishable from another” product.[4] Trade dress protection has been extended beyond the product itself or even its packaging to include such concepts as the shape, appearance, and overall design of a restaurant[5] or retail establishment.[6] As one court recognized, extending trade dress protection to the “look and feel” of a website can help protect the “intellectual property from a ‘careful infringer’ who has merely copied the ‘essence’” of the site.[7]

         

        Today, with so much commerce occurring online through web-retailers and online marketplaces, a new frontier of trade dress protection is testing the boundaries of protection under the law, as well as the question of what law is applicable.

         

      2. Trade Dress protection under Copyright Law and Preemption

         

        While copyright has been used to protect computer code, photographs, and compilations, websites tend to fail the originality requirement for copyright protection particularly in the context of compilation protection.[8] Thus, plaintiffs have looked to trademark law to protect the “look and feel” of their websites, and courts have found that a trade dress claim for the look and feel of a website is not preempted by the historically broadly construed preemption of the Copyright Act.[9]

         

      3. Elements of a Trade Dress Claim and How to Plead

         

        Trade dress, even if unregistered, falls under the protection of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.[10] “[T]he analysis for trade dress and [the analysis of] an unregistered trademark under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is very similar.[11] To assert a claim for infringement of unregistered[12] trade dress, a Plaintiff must show (1) the trade dress is protected, meaning it is source identifying or “distinctive,” either inherently or by acquired distinctiveness, (2) that as a whole the trade dress is non-functional (3) and that the defendant’s use is confusingly similar, or, in other words, substantially similar to the plaintiff’s trade dress.[13] In addition to satisfying these three elements, in pleading a trade dress claim the plaintiff must (4) allege the specific elements which comprise its distinct, source identifying trade dress.[14]

         

        1. The Trade Dress Must have Source Identifying Distinctiveness

           

          Distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired. Unfortunately, the design of a website is rarely inherently distinctive, leaving plaintiffs in the position of having to prove secondary, or acquired, distinctiveness. This is perhaps the biggest hurdle to asserting a “web dress” claim. The saving grace is that distinctiveness is a question of fact,[15] so the issue may survive a motion to dismiss if properly pled, and it may survive summary judgment if further substantiated in fact.[16] In cases where a plaintiff alleges distinct protectable elements rather than vague aesthetics or abstract ideas, success is more likely.[17] In discussing the trade dress, courts have come to refer to the design elements protected by the Lanham Act as the “look and feel” of a website.[18] A plaintiff may even lean on evidence that the defendant sought to copy their web dress; evidence of deliberate copying can support an inference that the web dress does indeed have secondary meaning, therefore satisfying the distinctiveness element on a motion to dismiss.[19] Along with “proof of intentional copying,” indirect evidence that may support finding secondary meaning includes “1) the length and manner of the use of the trade dress; 2) the nature and extent of advertising and promotion; 3) the efforts to promote a conscious connection between the public, the trade dress, and the source; [and] 4) the products’ established place in the market (possibly through continuous use in the market)”[20]

           

        2. The Trade Dress Must be Non-functional as a Whole

           

          Functional elements of a product are elements that are essential to the product’s use or that affect the product quality.[21] Elements are functional “if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage.”[22] These are not protected because doing so would stifle innovation rather than protecting source identifying characteristics. When addressing functionality, it is important to note that trade dress is generally examined in its aggregate, and the functionality requirement is no exception to the rule. So, having some elements of the trade dress be functional does not preclude protecting the trade dress as a whole.[23] Functionality is also a question of fact, and courts have declined to issue summary judgment where a plaintiff articulates nonfunctional similarities between websites.[24] Typically, as “long as there are alternate ways to design a web site, beyond the arrangement protected by the trade dress, the site's interface should not be considered functional.”[25] Furthermore, “[c]ourts have held that the overall appearance created by a combination of colors and design features is not functional.” [26] Thus, functionality is commonly satisfied in a web dress claim, particularly when many elements are identified, making an alternative trade dress for the competitor more available.

           

        3. Substantial Similarity between Websites: Likelihood of Confusion

           

          Likelihood of confusion hinges on at least eight factors, which vary slightly in each federal judicial circuit: (i) the strength of plaintiff's mark; (ii) the similarity of the parties' marks; (iii) the proximity of the parties' products in the marketplace; (iv) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap between the products; (v) actual confusion; (vi) the defendant's intent in adopting its mark; (vii) the quality of the defendant's product; and (viii) the sophistication of the relevant consumer group. No factor is dispositive, and analysis of each factor is a fact-heavy endeavor.

           

        4. Properly Articulating the Trade Dress to Survive Dispositive Motions

           

          A major challenge to protecting the trade dress of a web site (sometimes called “web dress”) is articulating exactly what the distinctive characteristics are that identify source and are thus subject to protection. Properly pleading and enumerating the elements of the web dress the plaintiff seeks to protect is essential to surviving a motion to dismiss.[27]

           

          First, the list must be complete. An open ended list will generally face dismissal because it does not give notice to the defendant or provide the court with the ability to fashion proper equitable relief.[28] Furthermore, it is important that in addition to listing the elements, the plaintiff provides some synthesis of the components and how they make up the look and feel of the site.[29] Alleging “the particularized combination of all of these elements” may serve that purpose in some cases.[30]

           

          Providing side by side photographs, in addition to listing the elements, can be persuasive, particularly when the sites are “essentially identical.”[31] Pointing to color scheme, layout, and similarly presented videos may be sufficient.[32] Illustratively, one unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act that survived summary judgment included the following list of web dress components:

           

          Logo in feminine script in pastel pink-orange hue in upper left corner of the page; Pink and orange script carried throughout the site; Close-up of model photos featured from head to mid-thigh, wearing white tanks with jeans, with long naturally wavy hair; Model photos feature mouse-over change of whimsical, casual poses to display all angles of the product; Featuring Model photos instead of product photos, throughout the site; Color and pattern of wallpaper; Category sliders; Dots for category sliders and similar colors of the dots; Placement of models to text in the sliders; The general fonts used; How the models are posing.[33]

           

          Ultimately, the ability to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be enough leverage to discourage bad actors. Fortunately, the blueprint for surviving such a motion is available. As with all motions to dismiss, courts will assess the factual allegations in the complaint to assess, if they are taken as true, whether relief is plausible on its face.[34] Courts routinely run through each of the trade dress elements on these motions.

           

                    The ease of pleading non-functionality is discussed above. Regarding distinctiveness, failing to allege facts showing inherent or acquired distinctiveness and relying on conclusory statements such as asserting that the website is “unique and distinct in the marketplace” will not be sufficient and may lead to dismissal.[35] However, in at least one instance, allegations bordering on conclusions were sufficient when a Plaintiff combined the identification of “a distinctive palette of colors and image/video filters featuring a clean, modern, and straightforward user interface highlighted by bright, vibrant colors set in an environment/backdrop of warm, baby tones” with allegations that the same was recognized by consumers as a symbol of Plaintiff, and that the website “incorporates a distinctive visual design, graphic treatment, and familiar interface that has become readily identifiable by the consuming public as originating from” Plaintiff.[36] In that case, the pleadings survived a motion to dismiss.[37]

           

          Some courts have looked to the extent of use of the trade dress elements by competitors to inform distinctiveness decisions. That is, they consider whether the particularized trade dress is unique or unusual in the field or if it is just a refinement of a common ornamentation for a class of goods. If the latter, it is not inherently distinctive. However, combinations of certain colors arranged in a certain design or printing style may create a distinct visual impression.[38] In contrast, where a design is simple and used by numerous competitors in the same field it is not inherently distinctive.[39] The key is to frame the protected features as a whole, focusing on protection of the particular combination of visual elements in relation to the product or source in a way that is not common throughout the industry.[40]

           

                    If the inherent distinctiveness angle fails, secondary meaning must be shown, and decorative or aesthetic features with no source identifying roles will not suffice.[41] While intentional copying can provide an inference of secondary meaning, such evidence is difficult to obtain, but imitation in conjunction with use of other elements not commonly used in the industry may persuade a court. In some cases, courts have granted leave to amend where the complaint was insufficient.[42] Of course, providing visuals of the trade dress to the court can be persuasive and put the defendant on notice of the trade dress plaintiff is looking to protect, but does not excuse the pleading requirement that the elements be listed.[43]

           

                    As to likelihood of confusion, illustrating the similarities between the aspects of the trade dress where the products are highly similar is strong supporting evidence, particularly where the advertisement and product is essentially identical.[44] In that case, obtaining a preliminary injunction may even be possible.[45] Alleging copying of “stylistic choices along with the content of the website, including the color, font, and hyperlinks, in a manner that is confusingly similar,” has been sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.[46]

           

          In sum, non-functionality and similarity are easier to satisfy than distinctiveness. A focus on elements that are of uncommon usage but copied by a competitor will help, as will any evidence of intentional copying.

           

    2. New York General Business Law § 349 Unfair Competition

       

      The essence of G.B.L. § 349 was well laid out in SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Jacqueline I. Fulop, D.M.D., P.C.[47]:

       

      N.Y. G.B.L. §§ 349 prohibits deceptive acts or practices . . . in the conduct of any business. The [statute] provide[s] a private right of action against businesses that injure them through deceptive acts or false advertising. To state a claim . . . a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant's deceptive acts were directed at consumers; (2) the acts are misleading in a material way; and (3) the plaintiff has been injured as a result. Although the statute “is, at its core, a consumer protection device, corporate competitors have standing to sue under §§ 349 . . . so long as some harm to the public at large is at issue. However, for a competitor to have standing under §§ 349 . . . , the gravamen of the complaint must be consumer injury or harm to the public interest, and the complaint must allege conduct that has significant ramifications for the public at large.

       

      General Business Law § 349 claims are often pled alongside trademark actions under the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts.[48] The New York Court of Appeals has recognized § 349’s breath and applicability to virtually all economic activity, but also the limitation that it is not applicable to private disputes and harms unique to the parties.[49] Fortunately, G.B.L. § 349 claims in Federal Court are subject to the less stringent pleading requirements of FRCP 8(a), and not 9(b).[50]  However, courts frequently require harm to the public beyond the simple risk of consumer confusion, such as a violation of FTC rules or a public health and safety risk.[51]

       

                It may be difficult to substantiate a public health and safety risk beyond confusion as to the source unless a court takes the narrow minority view that has only been taken in a handful of cases: that consumer confusion is sufficient harm to the public. [52]

       

  2. Jurisdiction

     

    The subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts for federal claims under the Lanham Act is without question,[53] and the same goes for state claims arising out of the same nucleus of operative fact.[54] In contrast, personal jurisdiction in New York may be difficult to obtain if the defendant is outside of New York or outside the United States, as is often the case when web-dress is being knocked off. Personal jurisdiction must be specific in such a case, rather than general, because the prospective defendant may be headquartered out of state or overseas, and thus it depends on an application of New York’s long arm statute to a foreign retailer’s or manufacturer’s contacts with New York consumers.[55]

     

    Fortunately, the Second Circuit very recently addressed the issue on analogous claims in American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, deciding personal jurisdiction existed over a foreign retailer for trademark infringement claims.[56] There, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged personal jurisdiction over a China-based retailer under the long arm statute by pointing to the sale of counterfeit dolls and use of the Plaintiff’s marks on the counterfeiter’s websites. Jurisdiction was proper based on transactions with New Yorkers alone, despite the dolls never actually being shipped into New York.[57] Simply allowing New York consumers to order and pay for the counterfeit dolls was enough.[58] The court relied on N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), which provides for jurisdiction of any non-domiciliary who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” Note that some jurisdictional discovery may be necessary to support this theory.

     

    Although the stream of commerce concept is a constitutional limit, and the New York long arm statute does not go as far as the constitutional limits allow for personal jurisdiction, the concept is embodied in both N.Y. C.P.L.R. §302(a)(1), discussed above, and N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3). Section 302(a)(3)(ii), provides for personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state. . . if he . . . expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.”[59] If jurisdiction is not satisfied under § 302(a)(1), then § 302(a)(3)(ii) may have support. Trademark infringement is a tort and trademarks must be used in commerce, so if the claim is in the realm of the Lanham Act there is going to be commercial activity going on. Again, jurisdictional discovery to substantiate revenue may be necessary.

     

  3. Conclusion

 

In conclusion, as ecommerce grows, and as more customer interactions occur through websites, agentic AI, or web-based self-service channels, rather than in a store or over the phone, businesses should keep an eye toward protecting their web dress with the same diligence they have historically protected the rest of their brand identity.

 


[1] Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989) (“the Act prohibits a manufacturer from ‘passing off’ his goods or services as those of another maker by virtue of substantial similarity between the products”).

[2] John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983).

[3] Conf. Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. CIV. 3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010), on reconsideration, No. CV 3:2006-76, 2010 WL 11569824 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2010).

[4] Id.

[5] See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).

[6] See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 4277914 (covering “the design and layout” of an Apple store).

[7] Conf. Archives, 2010 WL 1626072, at *16.

[8] See, e.g., Crown Awards, Inc. v. Trophydepot, No. 2:03-CV-02448-DRH, 2003 WL 22208409, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003); Darden v. Peters, 402 F. Supp. 2d 638 (E.D.N.C. 2005), aff'd, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007) (Affirming examiner finding that arrangement of website lacked the minimal degree of creativity required for copyrightability and was not copyrightable as a compilation).

[9] Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (W.D. Wash. 2007).

[10] Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209, 120 S. Ct. 1339, 1342, 146 L. Ed. 2d 182 (2000).

[11] Card Tech Int'l LLLP v. Provenzano, No. CV112434DSFPLAX, 2011 WL 13220408, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011).

[12] Trade dress registration is relatively rare in practice.

[13] See Salt Optics, Inc. v. Jand, Inc., No. SACV 10-0828 DOC, 2010 WL 4961702, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Express Lien Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Credit Mgmt. Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-3323, 2013 WL 4517944, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2013).

[14] See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641, 161 A.L.R. Fed. 737 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[F]ocus on the overall look of a product does not permit a plaintiff to dispense with an articulation of the specific elements which comprise its distinct dress.”).

[15] See Lepton Labs, LLC v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1238 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (distinctiveness is a question of fact that depends on whether ‘the purchasing public associates the dress with a single producer or source rather than just the product itself’).

[16] See Diamond Foods, Inc. v. Hottrix, LLC, No. 14-CV-03162-BLF, 2016 WL 3880797 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (declining to dismiss because nine visual elements of application including “consistent lighting, sequential timing, and consistent sizing regardless of distance. . . unlike the vague “rustic” and “weathered” aesthetics . . . therefore suffice to allege secondary meaning”).

[17] Id.

[18] See note 9, supra.

[19] See Ingrid & Isabel, LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (affidavits showing defendant explicitly instructed web vendor to create site sharing visual elements and concepts of plaintiff’s site supported inference of secondary meaning sufficient to raise issue of fact on summary judgment).

[20] Smartling, Inc. v. Skawa Innovation Ltd., 358 F. Supp. 3d 124, 149 (D. Mass. 2019).

[21] Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir.1987).

[22] Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001).

[23] Id. at 1259 (9th Cir. 2001).

[24] Ingrid & Isabel, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1137.

[25] Id.

[26] Card Tech Int'l LLLP, 2011 WL 13220408, at *5.

[27] See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he complaint does not enumerate what specific elements of its website comprise a distinctive trade dress ....”).

[28] See, e.g., Ingrid & Isabel, LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (noting that “including, but not limited to” qualification of listed elements is problematic”); Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, No. 09-04200 CW, 2010 WL 1881770 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) (dismissing web dress claim because plaintiff enumerated elements but qualified them as “some among many”).

[29] See Parker Waichman LLP v. Gilman L. LLP, No. 12-CV-4784 JS AKT, 2013 WL 3863928, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013) (complaint must synthesize elements of trade dress); FC Online Mktg., Inc. v. Burke's Martial Arts, LLC, No. 14-CV-3685 SJF SIL, 2015 WL 4162757, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2015) (“A complaint that lists only some, but not all, of the features of the plaintiff's website that the plaintiff believes constitute its trade dress is insufficient to state a plausible claim for trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act.”).

[30] Lepton Labs, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.

[31] Id. (Plaintiff alleged copying of “various features, including the format, background and text colors, photographs, comparisons, quotations, satisfaction guarantee, text, active-ingredient section, style, and trial offer. . . The alleged copying was so extensive that W4 and Gulf Rayz forgot to remove Lepton Labs's customer-service telephone number, which resulted in W4's customers actually calling Lepton Labs”); S. Beach Skin Care, Inc. v. Dermaset, Inc., No. 13-24645-CIV, 2014 WL 11958623, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2014) (refusing to dismiss web dress claim at early stage after viewing web dress “visually depicted in the attachments Defendant submitted with the motion to dismiss”).

[32] Smartling, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 147 (Plaintiff “has adequately identified a set of elements for which it claims trade dress protection”).

[33] Ingrid & Isabel, LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.

[34] See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

[35] See Arro-Mark Co. LLC. v. Warren, No. 2:22-CV-6663-JKS-MAH, 2024 WL 4053027, at *18 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2024).

[36] Bambi Baby.com Corp. v. Madonna Ventures, Inc., No. CV 18-12669-WHW-CLW, 2019 WL 2337447, at *6 (D.N.J. June 3, 2019).

[37] Id.

[38] Card Tech Int'l LLLP, 2011 WL 13220408, at *5.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm't Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2009) (Methods of proof of distinctiveness include direct consumer testimony; survey evidence; exclusivity, manner, and length of use of a mark; amount and manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of customers; established place in the market; and proof of intentional copying by the defendant).

[42] Creative Co-Op, Inc. v. Elizabeth Lucas Co., No. CV 11-116-S-REB, 2012 WL 761736, at *4 (D. Idaho Mar. 7, 2012).

[43] See S. Beach Skin Care, 2014 WL 11958623.

[44] Card Tech Int'l LLLP, 2011 WL 13220408, at *5.

[45] Id.

[46] Express Lien Inc., 2013 WL 4517944, at *4.

[47] No. 19 CIV. 9582 (NRB), 2020 WL 1322838, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (internal cites and quotes omitted).

[48] See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

[49] Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Bandwidth, Inc., No. 05-CV-6734T, 2007 WL 162763, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2007).

[50] UPS Store, Inc. v. Hagan, 99 F. Supp. 3d 426, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

[51] See, e.g., Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 491-492, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1814 (S.D. N.Y. 2008); Giggle, Inc. v. netFocal, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 625, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); M & T Mortg. Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“To provide the basis for a Section 349 claim, a disputed private transaction must have “ramifications for the public at large,” or be harmful to the general public interest.”).

[52] For cases supporting the minority views and finding likelihood of confusion sufficiently harmful to the public, See, e.g., CommScope, Inc. of N.C. v. Commscope (U.S.A.) Int'l Grp. Co., 809 F.Supp.2d 33, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Grgurev v. Licul, 229 F. Supp. 3d 267, 292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Sprint Sols., Inc. v. Sam, 206 F. Supp. 3d 755, 762–63 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

[53] See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 15 U.S.C. § 1121.

[54] See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

[55] See F.R.C.P. 4(k)(1)(A).

[56]  118 F.4th 271 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Zembrka v. Am. Girl, LLC., 145 S. Ct. 1130, 220 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2025).

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii).



Joe works in the Rochester, NY office of Heslin, Rothenberg, Farley & Mesiti, P.C., is an attorney barred in New York State, and is also registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Joe began his career at a litigation boutique before joining HRFM, where he now handles a broad range of intellectual property matters. His expertise includes trademark and patent prosecution, IP litigation, licensing, due diligence, nondisclosure agreements, and IP asset transfers, and domain name transfers. Joe also advises on IP trusts and estates as well as policing and enforcement issues, providing comprehensive support to protect and manage intellectual property assets. 

 

Joe graduated from Syracuse University College of Law cum laude and has a Civil Engineering degree from the Rochester Institute of Technology.  Before law school, Joe worked at a civil site design firm. Joe lives in Webster, NY with his wife Anna, their son Levi, and their dog, Bandit.  He enjoys playing hockey, golfing, skiing, and spending time in Otter Lake, New York with his family.