Supreme Court Issues Unanimous Decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment

On March 25, 2026, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment. The majority opinion limits contributory liability to situations where a party intended that its service be used for infringement, either by affirmatively inducing infringement or by selling a service tailored to infringement. A concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor argues that the material contribution test should be retained, and that other forms of secondary liability can be found, which is consistent with the position asserted by AIPLA in its amicus brief filed on September 5, 2025. To read the opinion of the Court, please click here. 

BACKGROUND

The case centers on whether an internet service provider (ISP) can be held liable for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers when the ISP receives repeated notices of infringement but does not terminate user accounts. Cox Communications, one of the nation’s largest ISPs, was sued by Sony Music and other record labels after rights holders sent hundreds of thousands of notices alleging that subscribers repeatedly shared copyrighted music via peer-to-peer networks. Plaintiffs argued that Cox knowingly allowed infringement to continue by issuing warnings but rarely terminating service. In 2019, a jury found Cox liable for willful contributory infringement and awarded $1 billion in damages. The Fourth Circuit later vacated the damages award while affirming the finding of contributory liability.

The Court heard oral argument on December 1, 2025, to address the central question: Can an ISP be held willfully liable for copyright infringement based solely on knowledge of infringing activity and a failure to terminate access? The case raises significant questions about the scope of secondary liability and the obligations of ISPs to police user conduct online. Sony argued that Cox’s failure to meaningfully enforce its repeat-infringer policy amounted to willful facilitation of piracy. Cox, by contrast, contended that contributory infringement requires affirmative conduct beyond mere knowledge, and that imposing liability for failing to terminate accounts would force ISPs to cut off entire households, businesses, and institutions based on the actions of individual users.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that an ISP is contributorily liable “only if it intended” that the service be used for infringement. The majority opinion further held that intent can be shown “only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement.” The majority cited its precedents in Grokster and Sony in support of its conclusions, and asserted that its holding is consistent with the Patent Act. The majority further held that Sony “overreads” the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and disagrees that Congress enacted the DMCA on the presumption that ISPs could be held liable in cases such as these.

Under the majority’s holding, an ISP cannot be found liable for secondary infringement based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement. As a result, it vacated the Fourth Circuit ruling and remanded the case.

CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, concurred in the judgment only. The concurring opinion asserted that “the majority, without any meaningful explanation, unnecessarily limits secondary liability even though this Court’s precedents have left open the possibility that other common-law theories of such liability, like aiding and abetting, could apply in the copyright context.” The concurring opinion acknowledged that contributory infringement “attaches when a party materially contributes in some ways to another’s infringement.” This is consistent with AIPLA’s amicus brief, which argued that the material contribution test should be retained in order for courts to have flexibility.

The concurring opinion further concluded that the majority’s opinion “dismantles the statutory incentive structure that Congress created” under the DMCA. “The majority’s new rule completely upends that balance and consigns the safe harbor provision to obsolescence.”

While the majority did not address it, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion analyzed the evidence before the jury and found that it failed to meet the level of support necessary to establish intent under an aiding-and-abetting liability standard. For that reason, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Jackson) concurred in the judgment only.